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Prelude: The Story of Edwin
Edwin is the second child of his mother, Naomi Rodriguez.' He was
born a year after his parents were married, although by that time the
marriage was unstable.2 Because of "certain marital difficulties" Ed-
win's mother andfather agreed to place him in state custody when he was
about one month old3 Shortly after that, his mother and father sepa-
rated, and eventually his mother reestablished a relationship with the
father of her oldest child, subsequently having another baby by that
union.4
Everyone in Edwin's family, except for his siblings, is visually im-
paired Edwin's sight is limited, his mother and step-father are legally
blind, and his biological father is visually impaired5
After Edwin's mother and father separated, his mother sought to have
Edwin returned to her.' Child Protective Services (CPS) resisted Edwin's
return and his mother filed an action in state court to regain custody of
her son. However, the trial judge ruled against Edwin's return home
commenting that: "there would be considerable risk in returning Edwin
to his mother because.. .her] handicap affected her ability to care for
an active boy; [she] was overly dependent on her family. .. .,7 On ap-
peal, the court found that the trial court's fears were unfounded, and that
the evidence instead "establishes petitioner's ability to run her household
well."I After Edwin had spent over three years in foster care he was fi-
nally returned home.9
The right of parents to raise their own children is so fundamental
that termination of that right by the courts must be viewed as a dras-
tic remedy to be applied only in extreme cases..... The standard of
clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability;
the evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; it
1. See Rodriguez v. Dumpson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding
that evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the mother's unfitness and awarding
custody to the mother).
2. See id. at 884.
3. See id
4. See id
5. See id (recounting the visual impairment of the parties involving, specifically that
Edwin has sight but suffers from retina blastoma).
6. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
822 n.5 (1977) (discussing Rodriguez' struggle to regain custody of her child).
7. See Rodriguez, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (examining the trial judge's assessment of the
mother's parental capabilities).
8. See id at 885 (pointing out that Edwin's mother has a high school diploma from the
Institute for the Blind, where she received good grades and studied childcare).
9. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 822 n.5 (acknowledging mother for "finally" prevailing in
custody battle for her child).
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must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of
every reasonable mind."0
INTRODUCrION
Substantial intrusion by the state in the parent-child relationship occurs
when the state provides protective services to a family: when the state
removes a child from her home in an emergency, when the state is
granted custody of a child, and when the state seeks termination of paren-
tal rights. This type of intrusion occurs almost exclusively in the lives of
poor people, and rarely in the lives of the middle or upper class." State
law, and to some extent federal law, govern all of the above instances of
interference in the relationship between a child and one or both of her
parents.
The law also governs the definition of the respective roles of the par-
ents, and the determination of child custody or parental visitation. How-
ever, in those instances the state itself is not a party and does not
intervene to take custody.' Parents from all economic groups engage in
activity, or lack of action, that is detrimental to their children. Our soci-
ety views such activity as requiring foster care for the child if the parent is
poor, and a private matter if the parent is rich.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze Child Protective Services'
(public family law), which serves the poor, and to confront the ways in
which it deviates from private family law. My belief is that the Child
Protective Services (CPS) system has never recovered from its roots in
distrust and discrimination against the poor, and that the system is mis-
takenly defended by asserting a false moral high-ground perceived from
the narrow focus on the moment of child-saving, rather than on the legiti-
mate and long term needs of our children. I recognize that society has an
obligation to protect children from those who are in a position to exert
unreasonable power over them. However, I believe that, because of its
structure and culture, our present system is not prepared to provide that
protection.
CPS is charged with a dual and contradictory responsibility. On one
hand, CPS is to provide "rehabilitative services" to parents to achieve a
10. In re Victoria M. v. Carmen S., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498,503 (Cal. App. 3d 1989) (articu-
lating the high standard for termination of parental rights).
11. See infra Part I (discussing the disparate treatment between the poor and the mid-
dle and upper classes).
12. See generally TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 151-156 (Vernon 1996) (detailing the pro-
cess dealing with the parent-child relationship).
13. CPS is was created by state law. See Thx. FAui. COD ANN. §§ 264.001, 264.002
(Vernon 1996) (formulating the child welfare services provisions).
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safe home environment for the children or to allow the children to be
returned after removal. 4 On the other hand, however, CPS is further
charged with gathering all of the facts necessary to prosecute and prove a
case for the termination of parental rights against those same parents.'-
The vast majority of children in foster-care continue to be from poor
families,16 with an over representation of children of color.17 Children of
color are more likely than white children to be poor.18 Of the children
who were "under age six, in 1990, fifty percent of African Americans
were poor and forty percent of Latinos were poor, [while] only fourteen
percent of white children ... were poor."19 Men and women of color
are more likely to be perceived by the state as inadequately caring for
their children,20 because they are more likely than the general public to
14. See id. at § 264.201 (describing the services offered by the department).
15. Given the impossible conflict in the roles of Child Protective workers, it is surpris-
ing that bum-out among them is not higher than it is.
16. During 1983, less than 20% of all children who did not live with their parents were
in foster care, but of the children who were in foster care, 60%-80% came from families
who received public assistance. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35
STAN. L. Rnv. 423, 432 (1983) (discussing the foster care system's use of dual family law);
see also Richard Wexler, There Is No Child Protection Without Family Preservation, TAMPA
TRm., Oct. 29, 1997, at 15 (describing how "foster care panic" has caused an increase in the
number of children in foster care and an increase in child abuse deaths).
17. In 1994, 72% of the children in state custody in B6xar County were either His-
panic or Afro-American. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsbom, Regional Director
for Children's Protective Services, San Antonio Region, Texas Dep't of Protective and
Regulatory Services, in San Antonio, Tex. (June 1, 1994); see also Zanita E. Fenton, In a
World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 HAv. BLAcKLE-rR J. 39,
39-44 (1993) (advocating for more attention in the adoption of black children). Fenton
reported that although most children in foster care are white, the proportion of minority
children in foster care is approximately forty-six percent, more than twice the proportion
of minority children in the population. Id. at 44.
18. See Fenton, supra note 17 at 48 (stating that finances are a crucial concern for a
family's survival); AMNmcAN BAR AsSOCIATION PRESmnNmnAL WoRnmuo GROUP ON TmE
UNMET LEGAL NEnDs oF CHILDREN AND THEnR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK
10 (1993)[hereinafter AMNmcA's CHILDREN AT RIsK] (offering statistics on children's pov-
erty levels).
19. AmEmcA's CHMLREN AT RIsK, supra note 18, at 10 (comparing the percentages
of poor African-American and Latino children with the percentage of poor white
children).
20. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory,
2 Tnx. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 98-99 (1993) (emphasizing that the definition of "bad mother-
ing" is broad). In discussing the wide discretion of prosecutors, Ashe and Cahn noted that:
[D]ecisions concerning prosecutions [of child abuse cases] wiU tend to reflect race,
class, and gender biases of prosecutors who have tended to be white, middle-class, and
male. Mothering is taken out of its context in abuse prosecution and is judged by ajudiciary that assumes middle-class, sexist, and racist norms. Mothers-across classes
and cultures-are expected to perform in ways that satisfy those norms.
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be poor, and as a result they are more likely to become involved with
CPS.2 '
I. CHL) PROTECrIvE SERVICES
A. An Historical Perspective
"From the standpoint of natural parents ... foster care has been con-
demned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor."' The
poor in general, and families of color in particular, are more likely to
have child welfare agencies intervene in their family relationships.2
Also, they are more likely to have their children removed and placed in
foster care, and have their parental rights terminated. 4 "The foster care
system's lack of concern for natural parents reflects centuries of a dual
family law-one for the rich and one for the poor."'  Family law for the
rich and middle-class, or private family law, developed primarily from law
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
21. For further discussion on class and ethnic bias in child welfare proceedings see
AmRmCA'S CHmILREN AT RISK, supra note 18, at 45-51 (discussing recommendations to
child welfare agencies regarding "vulnerable" families); see also Dorothy F_. Roberts, Pun-
ishing Drug Addict Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Pri-
vacy, 104 HARv. L. Ray. 1419, 1422 (1991) (declaring Women of color as "targets of
government control"). Cf. Ira Chasnoff, et al., The Prevalence of illicit-Drug or Alcohol
Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Flor-
ida, 322 Nuw. ENG. J. MmD. 1202, 1202-06 (1990) (asserting that bias and class affect re-
porting of drug abuse which can also influence reporting to child protective services);
Fenton, supra note 17, at 40 (claiming the inclusion of Black children in the adoption sys-
tem today occurred because "poor, urban Black children" are the children most in need of
social services); Garrison, supra note 16, at 472-73 (arguing that moving children rapidly
out of foster care into adoption melds well with white, middle-class norms, but does not
reflect the realities of the poor).
22. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
833-34 (1977) (stating that the poor resort to foster care more often than others because of
their lack of resources to purchase temporary private care).
23. See generally Judith Larsen et al., Medical Evidence in Cases of Intrauterine Drug
and Alcohol Exposure, 18 PnnP. L. Rnv. 279,287-88 (1991) (discussing the traits analyzed
for drug abuse during pregnancy are similar to those that are required for referral to the
welfare system). Larsen also argues these traits might additionally "discriminate against
poor, minority women by eliminating from scrutiny women who are economically better
off and who have continued their prenatal care while their drug and alcohol remained
undetected and unreported." Id.
24. See Fenton, supra note 17, at 40 (stressing the disadvantages and problems Black
children are forced to face); Garrison, supra note 16, at 434-36 (noting how the "Colonial
American poor laws" serve to disadvantage the poor).
25. Garrison, supra note 16, at 432 (tracing the poor treatment toward poor families
back centuries). See Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, CIange, and Continuity in
American Family Law, 28 I.m. L REv. 273, 288 (1995) (relating the manner in which cus-
tody law has evolved due to the use of a "dual system of family law").
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that protected the property interests of the early household.2 In con-
trast, family law for the poor2 7 developed primarily from the poor laws of
the early colonial period which were themselves descendent from the
Elizabethan Poor Laws.'
From the seventeenth through most of the nineteenth centuries, the
basic unit of American colonial society was the household, 9 not the fam-
ily as we know it." The household was the core unit of society and the
center of life and livelihood for every man.3' It was ruled by a man/
owner and included his wife, some or all of his children, possibly the chil-
dren of friends and relatives, and his servants, apprentices, indentured
servants, and slaves.-2 The law absolutely supported the man/owner's
rights vis a vis the other members of his household.3 It was not until the
26. See Ana M. Novoa, The Diminishing Sphere of the Cooperative Virtues in Ameri-
can Law & Society, HARv. LAT. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999) (discussing the formation of
family law).
27. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 433-34 (discussing the influence of the poor upon
the formation of family law.
28. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 433-34 (tracing back the laws for foster care to
Elizabethan poor law); see also Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private Chips Peti-
tions in Minnesota: The Historical Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protec-
tion on Services, 20 WM. MrrcHL.L L. REV. 781, 786 (1994) (detailing the historical
treatment of dependent and neglected children).
29. Within English high society, the importance of the household which supported the
nuclear family grew along with the strength of the state, both taking the place of the ex-
tended kin networks that were central to English high society before the fifteenth century.
See STEPHANm CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE 132 (1992) (bemoaning the manner
in which poor families have been historically mistreated); LAWRENCE STONE, THE RIsE ov
Tim NucL.nA FAMILY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 25 (noting the changes that accom-
panied the rise of the nuclear family).
30. Many times the word "family" is used to describe the colonial or post-colonial
household unit, but it is a misnomer. The unit included all who lived in the same com-
pound, whether family or servant, or slave.
31. See DAVID Hawke, THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 60 (1966) (explaining the struc-
ture of the family during Colonial times).
32. See John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING
IMAGES OF Ti FAlmLY 43, 47 (Virginia lfte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (explaining
the composition of a typical household); see also Ralph J. Crandall, Family Types, Social
Structure and Mobility in Early America, in CHANGiNG IMAGES oF THE FAMILY 61, 66-
79(Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (outlining the different types of family
structures); HAwKE, supra note 31, at 288 (describing society in early America); Barbara
Laslett, The Significance of Family Membership, in CHANGING IMAGES OF T-E FAMILY
231, 236-37 (Virginia Tbfte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (characterizing the household
composition of past times).
33. See HAwE, supra note 31, at 60 (indicating that the "male head of the family
ruled absolutely in law"); STONE, supra note 29, at 25 (noting the rise of the patriarchy in
the sixteenth century).
[Vol. 1".5
COUNT THE BROWN FACES
last half of the nineteenth century that the family, as such, became the
specific subject of the law.34
The basic unit of American colonial and post-colonial society was the
household, however, the poor did not form households. 3S Households
were only formed by the rich and middle-class, those who owned land.36
Instead, the poor were members of the households of others.' The chil-
dren of the poor rarely resided with their parents beyond childhood, and
society did not consider the bond between the child and the poverty-rid-
den parent worth protecting. Law and society protected the relationships
that formed the household, but not those that formed the family. Thus, it
is not surprising that intervention in the parent-child relationship of poor
families was so easily accomplished.38
Generally, English and American society from the sixteenth century
did not reproach adults who beat children.39 On the contrary, society and
the law accepted the right and responsibility of a man to use force to
bend the will of children under his care. ° Society showed a "fierce deter-
mination to break the will of the child, and to enforce his utter subjection
to the authority of his elders and superiors, .and most noticeably of his
parents."'" The most important virtue among children was obedience
which was believed to spring from respect for the power of the domi-
nant.42 Both Connecticut and Massachusetts, for example, enacted legis-
34. See Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, CJzange and Continuity in Ameri-
can Family Law, 28 IND. L. REv. 273, 275 (1995) (commenting that family law did not
become a categorized subject until later in the nineteenth century).
35. See Crandall, supra note 32, at 75-79 (pointing out the "indigent-laborer's" socie-
tal framework and lack of household structure among the poor).
36. See id (reporting the rich were better able to form households as they were the
most stable group in Charlestown).
37. See id (indicating the poor traveled often to find work and were not able to form
households).
38. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 434 (explaining the harsh consequences the poor
faced with regards to custody). "Under the Colonial American poor laws, indigent parents
who could not support their children simply lost custody of them; the children were inden-
tured as apprentices .... " Id. at 434.
39. See Michael Rosenbaum, To Break the Shell Without Scrambling the Egg: An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Intervention into Violent Families, 9 STAN. L & PoL'Y
REv. 409, 411 (1998) (discussing the waning interest in familial relations during early
America).
40. See SToiE, supra note 29, at 36 (noting the "overwhelming evidence" of the use of
force to raise and train children).
41. Id. at 36.
42. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Lmv, 1985 Wis. L REv. 1135,
1148 (1985) (noting a type of educational self-discovery in which a child learns obedience
through the use of strict authority).
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lation that allowed the death penalty for disobedience to parents. 43
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, much of what we now
consider to be child abuse was within the prerogative of the father or
male caretaker of children. The virtues of obedience, hard work, and re-
spect for property were learned through discipline." Poor children
learned these virtues by being servants in middle or upper-class house-
hold, a process thought to be of much greater value than any sentimental
feelings between the child and her parents.4" Consequently, while society
saw no reason to prevent parents from beating their children, it did recog-
nize a need to intervene in the parent-child relationship if the parents
were inadequate, as a result of being poor, unemployed, uneducated, or
of the wrong ethnic or religious background.46
The lower classes appeared to be more lenient with their children, at
least in the eighteenth century, but this may only be because most poor
children left their families around the age of ten.47 There may have been
some parallel leniency among the middle-class, since many middle-class
children also spent portions of their youth in the homes of friends and
relatives.48 The state, however, did not intervene in the relationship of
middle class families whether the father was lenient or violent.49
43. See Stone, supra note 29, at 42 (describing the increased subordination of children
reflected in state laws). In Connecticut there was further authorization "to commit a child
to the House of Correction on complaint from his parents" about rebellion or disobedi-
ence. I. at 43.
44. See Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at 1147-52 (examining the way children were
taught obedience through the use of strict authority).
45. See id. at 1147-48 (noting that the "poor laws" provided for children to be sent to
"reputable families" to become apprenticeships in order to learn the virtues of obedience).
46. In Massachusetts, children could be removed from their parents if they did not
know the alphabet by the time they were six years old. See CooNtrz, supra note 29, at 126
(stating that the Massachusetts Assembly ordered this removal). See also Garrison, supra
note 16, at 432-36 (discussing the foster care system's 'dual family law' approach which
resulted in poverty stricken parents losing custody of their children); Grossberg, supra note
25, at 288 (explaining that social reformers showed little tolerance of cultural, ethnic, or
class differences); Walling & Debele, supra note 28, at 790-91 (asserting that physical cru-
elty to children was treated as a private matter). Up to the middle of the 19' century,
children were removed from their families for poverty, "criminality and drunkenness" but
not for cruelty, because physical abuse was "deemed to be a private matter." See id.
47. See SToNE, supra note 29, at 48-49 (indicating that poor children left home at early
ages to become apprentices or to work as domestic servants or live-in labor In homes of
other families).
48. See Crandall, supra note 32, at 68-69 (describing the socialization of children in
merchant-planter families); Laslett, supra note 32, at 237-38 (recounting the fact that many
young adults lived in homes other than the home of their nuclear family).
49. See State v. Paine, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523, 533-34 (1843) (describing the
subordinated position of children in relation to the father). See generally Eiz~ABEM
PLEicK, Dormsrc TYRNNY: TH-E MAKiNG oF SocrAL PoLicy AorAsT FAMmY Vio.
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century, American society recog-
nized that its intervention in the parent-child relationship was based on
societal discontent with the poverty and ethnicity of the parents. 50 Upon
removal of the children, no effort was made to maintain the parent-child
relationship, it was simply not viewed as sufficiently important. A major
change occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the
rescue of white children from the vices of poverty could not be com-
pletely accomplished through indenture."' Indentured servitude became
illegal and more important; the head of the household had moved from
the household to the factory, and was no longer available to properly
mold the children.' Consequently, schools, poor houses, children's insti-
tutions, and reformatories took up the task of caring for poor white
children.53
The first child "abuse" case on record is that of Mary Ellen, in 1874.
Represented by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(SPCA), Mary Ellen was removed from her abusers (who were not her
parents or legal guardians), was placed in protective custody; her abusers
were tried for assault.5" Following her case, the Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Children was founded.56 But by this time, society al-
ready had a long history of intervention in the parent child relationship of
poor families, and of removal of poor children to the care of others.
Although there was outrage at the abuse of Mary Ellen and other chil-
dren, there does not appear to have been a true paradigm shift.1 There
LENtc FRoM COLoNIAL Tms To Tm PREs, r (1987) (discussing the prevalent use of
violence against children in Colonial times).
50. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 435 (stating that although the attitudes towards
poverty did not change, the stated reason for intervention became neglect).
51. As slaves, Black children were not considered for rescue as were poor white chil-
dren. See Fenton, supra note 17, at 41-43 (detailing how the traditions for adoption by the
Black community were very different from that of the white community).
52. As Professor Teitlebaum points out there were "simply too many such children for
private households to absorb." Teitlebaum, supra note 42. at 1150.
53. See id at 1152 (describing the roles taken by schools, houses of refuge, and
reformatories in the middle of the nineteenth century).
54. See Murray Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated Reporting
of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L Scu. J. Huzt. Rrs. 711, 715 (1993)
(describing the well publicized case that brought about changes in child abuse law).
55. See id. at 715 (explaining that the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals acted on Mary Ellen's behalf).
56. See Rosenbaum, supra note 39, at 411 (discussing the events surrounding Mary
Ellen's case); Walling & Debele, supra note 28, at 794 (explaining deyelopment of Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children).
57. See Rosenbaum, supra note 39 at 411-12 (discussing the public fury surrounding
the case of Mary Ellen Connolly); Walling & Debele, supra note 28 at 794 (denoting that
public interest in child abuse was high at the end of the nineteenth century). The Walling
article comments that the last part of the nineteenth century "witnessed the emergence of a
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was no substantial change in the factors that resulted in intervention.58
Child-savers continued to remove children from homes that were poor
and placed them in children's institutions.59 Additionally, there was little
or no intervention in the families of the financially stable, even if the
children were being physically abused."0 Following Mary Ellen's case,
and well into the twentieth century, reformers continued to "rescue" chil-
dren from the ills of improper upbringing-from the culture of poverty. 61
It is true that the rhetoric changed so that the cause of intervention was
stated as neglect, which was a euphemism for poverty,62 or as abuse. Un-
less it was severe, abuse by the middle and upper-class was shielded by
the private nature of the family.
As the mid-nineteenth century slid into the twentieth century, custody
in private family law moved from near absolute rights of the father to the
best interest standard, with the tender years doctrine helping to define
wealthy urban elite who... [after] [b]laming the immigrants and the poor.., hoped to
rescue the children" from poverty and social disorder. Id. Walling and Debele argue in
favor of recognizing the authority of private individuals to file petitions for the protection
of children. Id. at 825. Historically, there is a great deal of support for this contention,
since it was not until the 201 century that intervention was initiated by governmental bod-
ies rather than lay organizations or individuals. Id. at 783, 798. The authors, in drawing on
the history of intervention, consistently describe children in alternate care as "neglected or
abused." Yet, they ignore that modern standards did not exist then, although they do
clearly set out the fact indicating that children were placed in alternate care because of
poverty of their parents. Id. at 786, 791.
58. See Marjorie R. Freiman, Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the
Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 243,244 nn.6-11 (1982) (noting a
failed attempt by a social worker to intervene due to a lack of laws regarding intervention).
59. See CooNrz, supra note 29, at 132-33 (detailing child saver's action of sending
poor children to work in farms in the Midwest); Walling & Debele, supra note 28, at 792
(describing child-saving efforts of the nineteenth century).
60. See Coomrz, supra note 29, at 132 (indicating an increase in official intervention
in the lives of poor children).
61. Family historian Stephanie Coontz gives a scathing critique of child sayers of the
late 19"' century:
Almost invariably, they combined an exaggerated reverence for middle-class family
ideals with a contemptuous, punitive attitude toward the real-life families of immi-
grants and the poor... The new privacy that courts accorded middle-class families in
the nineteenth century was matched by the new arrogance with which such middle-
class reformers intruded into or even tore apart poor families.
Id.
62. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race
and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C.L. Rnv. 577, 605 (1997) (stating that if the
state's intervention is based on abuse or neglect, and the intervention revolves around
parental failings, the state's involvement will likely be deemed punitive rather than
protective).
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best interest.63 Public family law continued to focus on the poor as a
societal problem.,' Poor children were saved either because their living
arrangements were inappropriate or because they were engaging in delin-
quent acts.65 The policy in private family law changed from a focus on
ownership of the services and inheritance of a child, to the rights of the
parents to have custody and visitation with the child.66 Public family law
initially saved poor children from the vice of poverty, then from the ne-
glect caused by poverty, and sometimes from physical abuse by poor
parents.67
Protective services are still imposed primarily on the poor." State in-
tervention in the parent-child relationship is still primarily class/ethnic-
based.69 The focus of protective services has not moved to consider the
needs of children from all economic classes. It is still primarily focused
on the failings of poor parents; it is still primarily focused on the poverty
of the parents.
Middle-class parents now, as in the past, are able to afford caretakers
and boarding schools to alleviate the pressures of parenting.70 The poor,
however, are not able to afford caretakers and boarding schools, nor does
63. The 'tender years doctrine' was applied from the last halt of the 19t1 century until
the middle of this century. See Martha Freeman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Lan-
guage, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HAiv. L REV. 727, 737
(1988). The doctrine, or preference, applied a maternal preference for custody of young
children. See id. The doctrine was applied with some variation among the states, either
requiring the father to prove that the mother was unfit, or to affirmatively prove that pa-
ternal custody was in the child's best interest. See id. at 738.
64. See Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at 1151-54 (explaining that public agencies were
used for the care of pauper children and those children "who had been so poorly raised
that they could not be reached by voluntary school programs").
65. See id. (asserting that these acts were viewed as resulting from the poverty of the
parents).
66. The focus in private family law has alvays been to protect what is valuable to the
headlowner. In prior centuries, the value of children was economic, today it is the emo-
tional or emotional dependence experienced by the adult. See Novoa, supra note 26.
67. See Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at 1147-57 (analyzing the historical approach of
public family law).
68. In B~xar County, when attorneys are appointed to represent the parents in Child
Protective Services termination cases, the parents are very rarely screened for indigence.
Screening is the exception, not the rule. In criminal cases and in delinquency cases an
indigence screening is done routinely. Apparently, one may assume that parents in Child
Protective Service cases will be poor.
69. See Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation Af-
ter the Warren Years, 20 FAM. LQ. 255, 255-60 (1986) (referring to state intervention in
foster care as being class-based).
70. See id. at 258 (quoting a U.S. Supreme Court decision which discusses class and
foster care).
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society provide respite care for poor parents.7 The middle-class can af-
ford private therapy that is focused on family interaction. Yet the poor
cannot afford therapy to solve intra-family problems. With the emphasis
on the poor being personally responsible for their own poverty,72 there
seems to be a parallel requirement that the poor be personally responsi-
ble for their financial inability to provide parental support. Additionally,
while the dysfunctions of the middle-class are increasingly within the pri-
vate realm of the individual, the dysfunctions of the poor have for centu-
ries been fodder for public action. In most circumstances, the only
parental support services available to the poor are those available
through the public child protective service system,73 a system that takes
children away and terminates parental rights.74
CPS developed from intrusion into the lives of the poor, not from the
protection of children. The protection of children is a relatively new con-
cept to which our legal system and the child protective system is not yet
well suited.
B. The Poor
Child abuse and neglect occurs in all ethnic and racial groups, in rural
and urban areas, and in all economic classes.75 However, it is poor fatil-
71. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 833 (1977) (explaining that the poor have few alternatives for child care whereas
wealthier citizens have access to more resources); Lowry, supra note 69, at 258 (stating that
because the poor have few alternatives for care, they have "submit to state-supervised
childcare"). But see Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests
of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MLAMI L. Rv. 79, 129-30 (1997) (asserting
that there are some programs that provide early intervention, including respite and other
support services).
72. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Wel-
fare Reform) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.) (describing the purpose of providing assistance to needy families in
order to facilitate their independence).
73. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 833-34 (explaining that poor are disproportionately repre-
sented in foster care and other services); Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at 1152 (noting that by
the middle of the nineteenth century public services were widely used to serve poor
children).
74. The Civil Justice Clinic of St. Mary's University School of Law has represented 4
women (of only about 9 Child Protective Service cases) who, knowing they would be ab-
sent for a short period of time, left their child(ren) with an adult, only to come back and
find the child in state custody. In each case, the child was old enough to be strongly
bonded with the mother, and in each case, the family was managing on a marginal basis
prior to intervention.
75. See AMEuIcA's C-LDREN AT RsK, supra note 18, at 51 (commenting that chil-
dren of all races, communities, and economic classes are affected by child abuse and ne-
glect); Yar Fernandez-Aldana, Child Abuse: An Overview, 158 PLI/CmM 161, 163 (1991)
(stating that abuse "comes in all ages, colors, and from all economic levels").
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lies and families of color who "are more likely to be identified and co-
erced into accepting intervention by the child welfare system, and more
likely to have their children removed and placed in foster care." 6 This is,
in part, because poor women of color are the primary targets of govern-
mental controL"'
It is disheartening that the child welfare system is overpopulated to
such an extent by people of color, by the poor,78 the uneducated, and the
marginal. What is even more disheartening are the common beliefs about
the poor and child protection. First, that the poor overpopulate the sys-
tem because they are substance abusers and criminals. Second, that they
overpopulate the system because they are intellectually and/or physically
impaired. And third, using the same false reasoning, that the poor are
therefore more likely than the general public to abuse or neglect their
children.
In fact, even though the poor overpopulate the CPS system, they are
not more likely to be substance abusers. Consider a study conducted by
Dr. Ira Chasnoff:79 he studied the discrepancies in reporting by health
care professionals of the use of illegal drugs by pregnant women.' Chas-
noff and his fellow researchers tested 715 women for drug use in preg-
nancy."' They found no significant difference in positive toxicology
between white and Black women; 15% of the white women and 14% of
the Black women tested positive for drug use.' Of the 715 women stud-
76. AhmwcA's CHIDREN AT RisK, supra note 18, at 51 (1993) (discussing the fact
that families from different races and color are particularly affected by the child welfare
system). In addition "once in foster care, children of color are more likely to remain there
for long periods of time, and to experience multiple placements in different homes before
they are returned to their parents." Id.; see also Fenton, supra note 17, at 39 (explaining
how Black children are kept in foster care longer than other children).
77. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1422 (stating that governmental intrusion is espe-
cially harsh for poor women of color).
78. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
833-34 (1977) ("[Ihe poor resort to foster care more often than other citizens. For exam-
ple, over 50% of all children in foster care in New York City are from female-headed
families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children... 523% of the children in
foster care in New York City are Black and 25.5% are Puerto Rican.").
79. Ira Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Preg-
nancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,. Florida, 322 Nnv
ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202-06 (1990).
80. See id. (detailing the study conducted). Men's use of illegal drugs is also misrepre-
sented. See Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE ATLAmac MoIrIMiy 51,
Dec. 1988, at 54. Although white men are just as likely to use drugs as African-American
men, African-American men are five times as likely to be arrested for a drug offense. Id.
81. See Chasnoff, supra note 79, at 1202-06 (describing a study of 715 pregnant women
in Pinellas County, Florida).
82. See id. (noting that there was no significant differences in the positive toxicology
between white and Black women).
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ied, 133 women were reported to the authorities for drug use during preg-
nancy; 48 were white, 85 were Black.83 Although slightly more of the
white women abused drugs, twice as many Black women were reported
for drug abuse. As one would expect, there was a significant difference in
economic status between white and Black women, and almost all of the
women who were reported to the authorities were from the lower socio-
economic group."4
Clearly, substance abuse cuts across economic lines.85 For example,
several years ago, Courtney Love, the widow of rock idol Kurt Cobain,
was arrested on suspicion of heroin possession. The police suspected that
she was ingesting both heroin and Xanax, and friends reported that
Courtney was "so stoned on Xanax and other drugs, you could hardly
understand her."8 6 In the Courtney Love case, there was no indication
that the state had intervened in the family at the time of her arrest. Nev-
ertheless, she lost custody of he child for one month, after she admitted
that she had injected herself with heroin during her pregnancy,87 an act
which has resulted in the termination of parental rights for many a poor
mother. The fact remains that it is mostly poor drug abusers who become
involved with CPS.
88
Even though the poor and ethnic groups overpopulate the CPS system,
they are not more likely to be engaged in criminal activity.89 Middle-class
men are just as likely to engage in criminal activity as poor men, although
83. See id. (recognizing that although a total of 133 women in Pinellas County were
reported to health authorities for substance abuse after delivering their babies, Black wo-
men were reported 10 times more than white women).
84. See id. (emphasizing that poor women were more likely to be reported to health
authorities for substance abuse).
85. It is interesting that the rich and the poor tend to favor different drugs, so much
so, that we now even speak of "designer drugs." See Neal K. Katyal, Deterrence's Diffi-
culty, 95 Mic. L. REv. 2385,2434 (1997) (proposing a sentencing plan which provides for
the fact that drugs cut across different income levels and different crimes, including de-
signer drug crimes).
86. See Drugs Found in Cobain's Body, USA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1994, at 20 (describing
Love's arrest on suspicion of heroin possession); see also Passages, MAcLEAN's, Apr. 25,
1994, at 7 (reporting the arrest of Courtney Love for possesiion of heroin the day before
the discovery of her husband's body).
87. See Stephanie Reader, Grunger on the Mend in Rome After Binge, Brush with
Death, NNvs TRm., Mar. 5, 1994, at Al (detailing a lawsuit that Love filed against her
doctor and Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in which she alleges that information was leaked
to the press about heroin treatment she received while she was pregnant).
88. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1432 (stating that "[p]oor women ... are in closer
contact with government agencies, and their drug use is therefore more likely to be
detected.").
89. See Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, AT.ANnc MomiY, Dec.
1998, at 54 (stating that the use of illegal drugs by Blacks and whites is approximately the
same).
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poor men are more likely to be arrested and incarcerated. 90 Men of color
are more likely than white men to be stopped, questioned and challenged
by the authorities.91 Men of color are more likely to be the targets of
security scrutiny in retail establishments, and their presence is more likely
to be challenged in middle-class neighborhoods and places of business. 9
Poor people overpopulate the CPS system and they are, in fact, more
likely than the middle-class to live in substandard housing.93 The poor
are also more likely to move from place to place, and are therefore more
likely to be perceived as being unstable and being inadequate parents. 94
In general, negative misconceptions of the poor affect them in a number
of settings and in their dealings with government and bureaucracies. 95
For example, to identify mothers who are possible drug users, some medi-
cal personnel use traits that can be correlated simply to poverty, in-
dependent of drug use.96 Youth and lifestyle, in addition to poverty, can
90. See generally David Cole, What's Criminology Got to Do Wid It?, 48 STAN. L
Rnv. 1605 (1996) (citing MICHAEL ToNRY, MAIGN NErLcr: RAcE, CPrmw, AND PUN-
ismnTmiN AMRICA 29-30 (1995)) (discussing the manner in which race should be ac-
counted for in criminal law).
91. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discre-
tion, 67 FoaRDrLi L. REv. 13, 26-27 (1998) (pointing to studies which demonstrate that
police officers arrest African American males and present them for prosecution at dispro-
portionally higher rates than their white counterparts); Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Indus-
trial Complex, THE ATLANuc MoNTrLY, Dec. 1998, at 51, 54 (noting that over the past
twenty years, the proportion of African American men arrested for drug crimes has trip-
led, despite evidence that illegal drug use is equally prevalent among white men).
92. See Angela ". Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94
Mtca. L. Rnv. 1660, 1660-63 (1996) (arguing race discrimination by retail establishments
plays a role in the racism practiced by the criminal justice system); see also John Futty,
Young Blacks Suffer Unequal Justice, Conference Told, CoLubmus DiSPATCH (Ohio 1994),
at 6C (detailing the focus of a state-wide conference wherein participants noted that "insti-
tutional racism serves as a catalyst to crime"); Courtland Milloy, Unequal Justice in P.G.?,
WAsH. PosT, Feb. 25, 1996, at BI (reporting the internal investigation of police officer's
preferential treatment of white suspects in Prince George County).
93. See David Cole, Essay: The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEo. LJ. 2547, 2558 (1995) (opining that the stig-
matizing effects of criminal law enforcement in African American communities perpetu-
ates the cycle of single parent families, less adult supervision, unemployment, poverty, and
drug use).
94. Many students in my family law classes find it acceptable and appropriate to re-
move children from their homes due to the lack of running water, electricity, or because
the family is homeless or moves from place to place.
95. See Austin Sarat, ". .. The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HtmbN. 343, 346 (1990) (describing
how the welfare poor are caught in the "power and domination" of bureaucratic officials
and social and legal institutions).
96. See Larsen et al., supra note 23, at 287(noting that "lack of neatness and cleanli-
ness" may be a clue to a woman's drug habit).
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result in traits that are similar to those associated with drug use.97 Simi-
larly, the state still intervenes in the parent-child relationship for issues
that are purely associated with the poverty of the family." Additionally,
physically impaired children are "more likely to be placed in a foster
home ... if they [are] from poor families." 99 Conversely, if the parents
are poor and physically or mentally impaired, the children are more likely
to be removed or like Edwin, never returned.
The Story of Ca nen
Carmen was a mildly retarded mother who had been involved with
CPS for several years.' 0 She had a history of moving frequently and
providing insufficient food to her children.101 The children were taken
from her custody when she was about to be evicted from the hotel where
she and the children had been living.'"2 Stanislaus County Department
of Social Services alleged that Carmen "had persistently failed to pro-
vide the children with proper care""°3 Initially, Carmen tested in the
range of mildly retarded with an IQ of 58 and subsequently of 72.104
Her life skills counselor concluded that "[her low level of functioning
makes it difficult for her to learn the necessary skills she needs to ade-
quately parent her children .... 1 5 After a judge terminated her paren-
tal rights on the basis of development disability, the court, on appeal
found that the plan of service contained nothing specifically tailored to
Carmen's limitations,"6 and sent the case back to the trial court for ex-
ploration of possible alternatives to termination."0 7
97. See id. at 287-88 (noting that prostitution during adolescence is an example of
poverty of the family).
98. See, e.g., E.L.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 732 S.W.2d 785,786 (Tex. App.-
Christi 1987, n.w.h.).
99. Cathy S. Widom, The Role of Placement Experiences in Mediating the Criminal
Consequences of Early Childhood Victimization, 61 Am. J. ORTHOPsYcHIATnY 195, 196
(1991).
100. See In re Victoria M. v. Carmen S., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (Cal. App. 3d 1989)
(ordering lower court to explore possible additional alternative services, because, in light
of Carmen's limitations, services offered before termination were insufficient).
101. Sde id. at 500.
102. See id.
103. 1d.
104. See id
105. Id. at 501.
106. See In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
107. See id at 506.
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I. FOSTER CARE
In colonial and post colonial America, when children were removed
from poor families, there was no expectation of their return.'" Instead,
the focus was on removing the children from the risk without considera-
tion of what would happen to the children thereafter.10 9 It was not until
this century that foster care was viewed as a temporary placement in a
system whose stated goal was the reunification of the family.110 How-
ever, once children were taken into state custody, even though foster care
was conceived as temporary, the children often remained in state care for
years."1 Historically, state care has never been short-term in practice,
although the foster-care placements were contractually and philosoph-
ically temporary."1 In part as a result of the inconsistency, children were
moved from place to place as the years went by."L Evidently, the focus
of the system was never on the authentic needs of the child, instead the
focus has been on the middle-class adult celebration of victory exper-
ienced at the moment of child-saving.114
The state makes a bad parent. Although there are many wonderful
foster parents, child welfare workers, supervisors, and administrators will
108. In the colonial northwest, children from poor families were indentured or bound-
out to wealthier families where they remained. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 434.
109. Some poor children were shipped off to the West and Midwest presumably to
work as free or cheap labor in farms. The homes to which the children were sent to were
not screened with regards to safety. The safety of the children was not the focus. See
COONTZ, supra note 29 at 132, 133.
110. The preference or default policy in Texas is to return children to their homes. See
generally TEL FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 261, 262, 263, 264 (Vernon 1996).
111. See TEXAs SutREl1E COURT TAsK FORcE ON FOS=ER CARE, EXEcutvE Subm-
,iA.RY 10, 11, 19 (1996) [hereinafter EXEcunvE StmhsARY] (citing the Task Force's report
that found the average waiting period, between 1991 and 1995, for long term substitute
care was 13.2 months, while the wait for adoption placement was over 30.5 months). The
Task Force also reported that it took an average of 40 months to complete an adoption
from start to finish. See id. See also Fenton, supra note 17, at 44 (stating that Black chil-
dren will remain in foster care longer than white children; AbmRcA's CHIDREN AT RisK,
supra note 18, at 51 (stating that children of color are more likely to experience multiple
placement and institutional placements than white children).
112. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 428, 437 (distinguishing that the purpose behind
foster placement was to create a temporary intervention period in which both parent and
child would receive assistance in order to address family problems).
113. See Lowry, supra note 69, at 259 (citing commentators who concluded that the
lack of overall structure in the foster care program has lead to the displacement of children
who face multiple transfers). A recent study in New York found that nearly 60 percent of
the children in foster care experienced more than one placement and another 28 percent
were transferred three or more times. See iL
114. See infra Part LA.
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readily concede that the foster-care system is harmful for children.11 5
Judges are not surprised when they see children run away while in state
custody and return to the same parents from whom the courts were so
ready to save them. Courts are not surprised when children who were in
state custody, reappear as the "abusive parents" of another generation of
children. For some children the potential for harm is greater in the cus-
tody of the state than the harm for which they were removed from their
homes. Why is foster care so detrimental?
There are at least three difficulties with foster care. First, when chil-
dren are removed from homes where there is a risk of harm, the child-
savers assume that state custody is 'safe' and 'neutral.' They fail to weigh
the potential for harm if the child is left in the home against the emo-
tional harm if placed in foster care. There is a risk of sexual and physical
abuse while in state custody," 6 but that risk is not considered. Another
risk that is not considered is the harm caused by the breaking of emo-
tional parental bonds." 7 The system presumes state custody to be "safe."
Second, once in state custody, many children remain there for years." 8
They usually experience a series of temporary placements over an ex-
tended period of time. Children who are in "temporary care" for years
are frequently moved from place to place." 9 The instability of placement
and the lack of continuing relationships with adult care-givers is severely
detrimental to children. The tragedy is that for those cases where long
term non-parental care is necessary, it is possible to successfully recruit
and develop stable long-term foster care that would allow the children to
115. See G.M. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 717 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App-
Austin 1986, n.w.h.) (detailing the evidence put on by the state showing the detrimental
effects of foster care). The state argued that the act of a parent allowing a child to be sent
to foster care is so injurious to the child that it should be sufficient grounds for termination
of parental rights. See id The Court rejected the idea that foster care placement was a
voluntary act by the parent and found the argument both untenable and ironic. See id.
116. See, e.g., Sally Kestin, Series of Child Deaths Puts Focus on Agency, TAMPA
Tm., Sept. 14, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 13832680. The child was removed from
her parents at the age of four. See id She was never returned to them and while in state
care experienced 24 placements, and was abused in at least 2 of those placements. See id.
117. See Wendy Glockner Kates et al., Whose Child is This?: Assessment and Treat-
ment of Children in Foster Care, 61 Am. J. ORTHopsYcHIATRY 584, 584-85 (1991) (arguing
that mental health professionals are faced with a unique dilemma, attempting to place
abused and neglected children in foster care while knowing that such traumatic separation
causes psychological injuries to the child).
118. See ExctryrrvE SummARY, supra note 111, at 10-19 (explaining that in Texas, It
can take two years before the child leaves substitute care).
119. See id. at 38 (noting that over 30% of the young people in foster care who were
surveyed in 1996 had been in four or more placements, and over 40% had had four or
more caseworkers).
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remain in stable and continuing placement for years.22 And third, be-
cause of the large number of children in care, social workers are seriously
overworked and unable to provide sufficient services to accomplish fam-
ily reunification. When CPS takes custody of children in marginal cases,
unmanageably large caseloads develop, resulting in the caseworkers' in-
ability to respond adequately to severe or real emergencies.'' A high
instance of state intervention consequently cripples the efforts to protect
children.
Several years ago, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services adopted the informal goal of limiting state custody to one
year."n But the goal was difficult to reach. If the children were removed
from a family where the home was poor, or dysfunctional, rather than
severely abusive, termination was difficult. The state could not prove ter-
mination was appropriate because being dysfunctional is not grounds for
termination.123 The state set up difficult standards for these parents, who
often lost heart and interest. 4 Many of these parents might not have
been lost, however, if the state had worked with the family without re-
moving the child. Many of these cases might have been resolved more
appropriately if the state had not institutionalized removal and termina-
120. In October 1998, I was in court with one of my pro bono cases, and the court
asked the state about the possibility of a long term (permanent) agreement with the foster
care mother. The child had been with the same foster mother for appro.imately nine
years, since he was a toddler. Parental rights had been terminated years ago, and the child
was not appropriate for adoption. The CPS supervisor informed us that the department
was unconvinced that long term placement was an option and was still assessing the policy
on long term placement agreements.
121. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to
Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J. L & PuB. PoL'Y 539, 540 (1985)
(proposing that a "high level of unwarranted intervention does not prevent many obviously
endangered children from being killed and injured, even after their plight becomes known
to the authorities.").
122. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsborn, supra note 17 (stating that a goal in
Bdxar County is to limit foster placement to one year); see also ExEctrrvE SumtARy,
supra note 111, at 43 (recommending a statutory limit on the time that a child can spend
under the Temporary Conservatory of the State). The state has now codified that goal, in
compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified as amended scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
123. See Tax. FAi. CODE ANN. § 161.001, (1)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (requiring the
court to order termination if by clear and convincing evidence, it is shown that the child is
placed "in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well being
of the child"). Id. at § 161.001, (1)(E) (placing children with "persons who engage in con-
duct which endangers the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child").
124. See Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588 (describing parents' response of becoming
intimidated or alienated by social service system, and suggesting that parents who are un-
able to maintain meaningful contact with their child respond to their emotional devastation
through detachment).
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tion as the standard response in dealing with poor and dysfunctional
families.
Still, Texas has made substantial changes in its law over the past several
years in an effort to prevent foster care drift. Texas now requires the
state to file a permanency plan with the court no later than ten days
before the mandatory six month hearing."z By that time the state must
be sure whether it will be recommending termination or reunification.
126
Further, the state is to request a final order or move to dismiss the suit at
the expiration of one year from the date the child enters custody."2 7 Ad-
ditionally, Texas amended the section of the Family Code dealing with
involuntary termination to add several new provisions, thus making it
easier to terminate the parental rights of a child who is in state custody.128
The changes might be beneficial, if coupled with early prevention pro-
grams and strong family reunification programs. However, the state can-
not simply continue to intervene where the primary problem is poverty
without addressing the root causes of the family problems. The require-
ment to resolve CPS cases coupled with the easy termination process will
simply result in a wholesale loss of children by the poor, and especially by
people of color.
The Story of Kathaleen
Kathaleen was born when her mother, Marie, was only sixteen years
old.29 Kathaleen was placed in foster care, with strangers, when site was
a little over a year old"'3  Her mother's plan of service31 required that
125. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.303(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (requiring that a
plan of action be included in a status report filed with the court no later than 10 days
before the hearing).
126. See TX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.303(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (detailing that the
status report must evaluate parents' compliance with prior service plans and recommend a
course of action from a list of possible options). The list includes returning the child to her
home, or for children with "special needs or circumstances," deviating from the prescribed
list. See id. at Tax. FAM CODE ANN. § 263.303(b)(2)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
127. See Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (stating the court
may enter an extension but for no longer than 180 days).
128. See Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 1999) (stating reasons why
the court may terminate parental rights).
129. See In re Kathaleen, 460 A2d 12, 15 (R.I. 1983) (holding that the child protective
agency met its burden, by clear and convincing evidence).
130. See id. at 13. The mother had voluntarily placed the child in the temporary care
of the child welfare service. See id. Later, the agency refused to return the child to her
mother and proceeded an action to terminate her parental rights. See id.
131. A plan of service states the goals and objectives that must be met before the child
can be returned home. The plan sets out who is responsible for each item. It is sometimes
drafted by CPS, and given to the parent. In some areas it is developed jointly by the
worker and the parent. Today, generally the parent must sign the plan, file it with the
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Marie find employment and an apartment visit with Kathaleen, and
participate in counseling.'3 2 Marie did not receive counseling, but she
did follow through with all of the other requirements of the plan of ser-
vice.133 Nevertheless, Kathaleen was not allowed to return home to her
mother." A psychiatric evaluation conducted by court order concluded
that Marie was unable to provide consistent parenting for Kathaleen.35
The evaluator concluded that "Marie had difficulty with interpersonal
relationships, difficulty following through with commitments, and an in-
ability to recognize her problems or appreciate her situation."'3 6 In the
meantime, Marie had another child who the state allowed to remain in
her custody. Apparently, the state believed that Marie was able to care
for the new baby but not for Kathaleen. Once Kathaleen's parent-
child relationship with her mother was terminated, she lost her relation-
ship with her mother and her sibling.18 On appeal, the termination was
upheld 139
IIl. PERMANENCY, EXCLUSIVENESS, AND JOINT CUSTODY
In Texas, as in many other states, private family law has encouraged the
continual participation of both parents in the lives of their children. Over
the past several years, there has been an increase in visitation rights of
non-custodial parents. 40 The minimum visitation schedule, presumed to
court, and it can be the basis of termination of parental rights if the parent fails to comply.
See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.102,263.103 (Vernon 1996) (detailing the required con-
tents of the service plans).
132. See In re Kathaleen, 460 A.2d 12, at 13.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (acknowledging that Marie had a second child but only had her parental
rights with respect to Kathaleen terminated).
138. See In re Kathaleen, 460 A.2d at 13 (R.I. 1983).
139. See id. at 15 (indicating the family court's decision of terminating Marie's paren-
tal rights is affirmed).
140. In 1989, the Texas Legislature provided the courts with guidelines which pre-
sumed possessory rights of a parent named as a "possessory conservator." See Act of Sept.
1, 1989,71st Leg., R.S., ch. 617, § 4, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 2030,2030-35, repealed by Act of
Apr.20, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 151-52. In 1993, that
presumption was amplified by legislative amendment. See Act of Sept. 1,1993,73rd. Leg.,
R.S., ch. 766, § 4,1993 Tex. Gen- Laws 2989,2991-92, repealed by Act of Apr. 20,1995,74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113,151-52 (codified at Tx. F~m. CODE ANN.
§§ 153.251-153.253 (Vernon 1996)) (adding to the statute circumstances when the standard
possession order would be inappropriate or unworkable).
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be in the best interest of the child, has been expanded.14' Grandpar-
ents' 42 and step-parents"43 have been given the right to obtain access to
the child. A preference for joint custody, and a policy of encouraging
fuller participation by the non-custodial parent, have been adopted in
many states. In some states, violence by one of the parties will not affect
visitation rights unless the child was the victim of the violence.' 44 Even if
the child was victimized, the court is required to enter a visitation sched-
ule. The court is required to use the least-restrictive plan consistent with
the safety and welfare of the child. 45 The termination of an absent par-
ent's rights is usually not deemed to be in the child's best interest unless
there is a third-party or step-parent adoption looming.'4 6
By contrast, in child protective cases, the state will rarely seek a perma-
nency plan'47 that includes continued contact with the parent. Most cases
where the child is not returned home result in the termination of all pa-
rental rights. Some of those cases end with the appointment of the state
or a third-party as custodian, with some parental visitation. The focus is
141. See Tax. FAm. CODE Am. § 153.251(b) (Vernon 1996) ("It is the policy of this
state to encourage frequent contact between a child and each parent for periods of posses-
sion that optimize the development of a close and continuing relationship between each
parent and child.").
142. See id. at § 153.433 (Vernon 1996) (detailing circumstances when a grandparent's
request for access to a grandchild will be granted).
143. See ia at § 102.003(9) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (allowing persons who had actual
care, control, and possession of a child for six months prior to the action to bring a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship).
144. See id at § 153.131(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (stating that a parent will be ap-
pointed sole or joint managing conservator unless it would significantly affect the child's
physical health or emotional development); id. at § 153.004 (indicating that the court will
take into account a history of domestic violence before appointing a party as a sole or joint
managing conservator); DRAFT ComwMTrrr on GENDER BASIS IN THE CouRTs, AcHiEv-
ING EQUAL JusTaCE FOR WOMEN & MEN IN Ta CouRTs 47 (1990) (stating that violence
will not affect visitation); see also In re Michael G., 74 Ca. Rptr. 2d. 642, 644, 652 (1998)
(allowing the parents to maintain visitation rights even though three of their other children
were taken away because of emotional and physical abuse); Barkloff v. Woodward 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 167, 170-71 (1996) (reversing lower court decision granting visitation rights to
former boyfriend who was suspected of sexual abuse and was not the child's biological
father). But see Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 284 (1992) (holding that in a protection
order, a "finding of immediate danger to the [child]" was not needed before temporary
custody could be determined).
145. See Tax. F~A. CODE AN. § 153.193 (Vernon 1996) (providing that terms of an
order denying possession of a child or imposing restrictions on parent's possession "may
not exceed those that are required to protect the best interest of the child.").
146. This seems to be the practice in B~xar county. Several judges have articulated
such a preference in the absence of extreme circumstances. The policy is based on a desire
to preserve the child's right to financial support.
147. A permanency plan is a document compiled by the caseworker which sets out the
goal for the case, and the time frame for accomplishment.
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so firmly placed on punishing the parent for the inability to parent, that
the child's need to maintain some contact with the birth parent is lost.
When I have suggested that the state retain managing conservatorship
over a child, while still allowing contact with her parent to preserve the
parental relationship, the state would most commonly respond that this
recommendation deprives the child of closure and permanency.
Closure and permanency are key concepts in the book Beyond the Best
Interest of the Child, by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. 48 The authors ar-
gue that the law must consider the needs of the child as paramount 49 and
that one of the most important needs of the child is continuity. 150 Ac-
cording to Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, "[c]hildren have difficulty in re-
lating positively to, profiting from, and maintaining the contact with two
psychological parents who are not in positive contact with each other."''
The authors identify the parental relationship as developed through nur-
turing contact, not through biological ties.'5 They believe that a child
needs a continuing, unambiguous, authoritative parental figure and that
other relationships should be sacrificed in order to achieve it." The
state has adopted portions of this theory in the child welfare arena. The
state assumes that it provides a stable, nurturing, unambiguous and au-
thoritative parental figure for a child, which should supersede the rela-
tionship between a poor and marginal parent and her child. Like our
counterparts in the colonial period, we presume that middle-class inter-
vention will provide a positive change for the children of the poor.
If the theories of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were applied in the di-
vorce setting, one parent would be granted full custody and control of the
child. The custodial parent, not the court, would "decide under what con-
148. See generally JosEPHi Gous-mN E AL-, BEYOND THE BFST INERFsT OF "THE
Cin= 47 (1973) [hereinafter BEST INrERnsr] (declaring that the law's first priority should
be the psychological health as well as the physical well-being of the child).
149. See id. at 7 (describing the author's first value preference); see also Tnx. F~A..
CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 1996) ("The best interest of the child shall always be the
primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and posses-
sion of and access to the child.").
150. See BEST Ir~rNmEsr, supra note 148, at 7 (identifying the author's second value
preference, as the parent's right of privacy "[t]o safeguard the rights of the parents to raise
their children as they see fit, free of government intrusion.").
151. Id. at 38.
152. See id. at 17 (professing that emotional bounds are created when a parent pro-
vides day-to-day care and needs, whereas a biological parent who falls to provide a child's
needs becomes a stranger).
153. See, eg., id. at 38 (describing the loyalty conflicts endured by children who have
to keep contact with two parents who are not in contact with each other). But see Garri-
son, supra note 16, at 449, 474 (denouncing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's philosophy that
a child should not have conflicting loyalties, including parental ones).
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ditions to raise the child."' 54 The non-custodial parent would "have no
legally enforceable right to visit the child."' 55 The custodial parent would
have exclusive control over the frequency and duration of visits with the
other parent.156 That, however, is not the rule in private family law.
The Story of Bianca, Natalie and Jeremy
Bianca, Natalie and Jeremy'57 were placed in the temporary custody
of the state when Bianca was a newborn, Natalie was 15 months old, and
Jeremy was nine years old"' In reviewing the trial court's termination
of parental rights, the court of appeals found that the evidence indicated
that the two-bedroom house where the children and their mother lived
was "adequately furnished, well organized, clean and neat ,59 Even the
family's caseworker testified that there were no problems with the physi-
cal conditions the children were living in. Although Natalie had been
tested as developmentally delayed, she was tested in English, which she
did not speak very well; and, although Jeremy had extensive absences
from school, the evidence showed that many of the absences were ex-
cusead"'6 The state claimed the children's mother was an addict and
dealt in prostitution, yet it did not prove those allegations, nor did it
show that the children were endangered 16' The state alleged two
grounds for termination.162 (1) that the parent "knowingly placed or
knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child,"' 3
and (2) that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical
154. BEsT INTERnsr, supra note 148, at 38.
155. Id.
156. See id
157. See Rodrfguez v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 737 S.W.2d 25,26 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1987, no writ) (holding that the evidence did not support order of termination).
158. See id. The Texas Department of Human Services intervened and obtained cus-
tody of the three children after Bianca tested positive for opiates at birth. Id. at 26.
159. Id. at 27.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. (stating that Virginia Rodriquez knowingly placed her children in danger-
ous situations and engaged in conduct that placed them there).
163. Act of Jan. 1, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen..Laws 1411, 1427
(amended 1997) (current version at Tmx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon Supp.
1999)) (allowing termination of parental rights if the parent engaged in one of a specified
list of activities, and if termination were in the best interest of the child); Rodriquez, 737
S.W.2d at 27 (terminating parental rights in compliance with the statute).
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or emotional well being of the child." 11 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's termination of parental rights of all three dcildren.1"
IV. BST INmER=ST
A. We Don't Know Why We Love Them But We Do
Children, particularly children in need, arouse in us the desire to pro-
tect and nurture. Who is not moved by the sight of starving, disease-
ridden children of the third world? Who can keep from smiling at the
picture of a healthy, clean, happy, bouncing baby? Children are show-
stoppers. They draw our attention. They appeal to our emotions and
create in us a very strong emotional response.
The images of children that draw somewhat idealized emotional re-
sponses from us are very different from the reality of raising a child. A
child cries and is dirty more often than she is clean, and her demands
increase in complexity as she advances in age. If it were not for the emo-
tional pull of babies and young children, most of us would give up parent-
ing. The extremely strong emotional response to a child, balanced against
the reality of parenting, keeps parents sane and somewhat focused.'6
When confronted with the image of an abused or neglected child, we
also experience a strong emotional response. We want to rescue the
child, to remove her from harm and put her in a place that will be safe
and nurturing. A place where she will be properly fed, clothed, and
happy. However, while we want to rescue the child, we want to do it
without taking on the personal responsibility of the child."6
B. The Needs of the Child
Generally, a child needs to be fed, clothed, housed, educated, nurtured,
kept safe and clean, provided with medical care, and appropriately disci-
plined. But what are the specific and special needs of a child who is from
a substantially dysfunctional family? "While professionals and society
cannot condone any form of mistreatment of children, the belief that they
need to be "rescued" from their families may be counterproductive. The
164. Act of Jan. 1, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1427
(amended 1997) (current version at TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp.
1999)); Rodriquez, 737 SAV.2d at 27 (discussing termination of parental rights in compli-
ance with the statute).
165. See Rodriguez, 737 S.W.2d at 29.
166. This paper will not discuss when, why, and how parents lose that balance and
focus, yet it is clear that it is not an occurrence limited to the poor.
167. See generally Garrison, supra note 16 (denoting the number of children involved
in the foster care system). The author uses these numbers to draw the inference that indi-
viduals are not willing to take on the personal burden of rearing the child. See id. passim.
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rescue myth ... deprives the children of their natural place in their fami-
lies ... 16 However, the "rescue myth" is deeply rooted in our his-
tory,169 and responds to our need to provide instant protection from
socially constructed harm.170 The "rescue myth" allows us to feel good
about ourselves, but does not necessarily respond to the continuing needs
of the child. The myth "underestimates the children's separation trauma,
[and] ignores the risks of foster care itself .... 171
It is better for a child to grow up in a dysfunctional family that is
hers172 than to be removed 73 to a balanced family that is not hers. 74
Children who are removed from their home suffer and mourn the loss of
their parent(s) as much as they do when a parent dies. 75 The trauma of
separation frequently manifests itself in "intense generalized hostility.' 17
This unresolved mourning may result in tantrums, aggression, crying, dif-
ficulty in school, and other symptoms of depression and anxiety.177
Children perceive their placement in foster care not as a relief from
victimization, but as a threat to their very survival.'78 Consequently, chil-
168. Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588 (arguing that placing children in foster care is
frequently counter-productive to the desired goal).
169. See infra Part I.A.
170. A child's attorney recently told my Civil Justice Clinic students that she was not
going to recommend returning our client's children home. Our client was not the alleged
perpetrator; she had completely separated herself from the perpetrator. Although she had
fully complied with the plan of service, the attorney had some concern that the children
might be at risk, and, as she said, at least now they were in a safe place.
171. Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588.
172. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 467-69 (stating it is better for the child to deal
with their flawed biological parents, than to be removed, thus devising fantasy parents,
which ultimately effects the child's long term development); Kates et al., supra note 117, at
584-85, 588 (bemoaning the separation of a child from a parent because it leaves the child
wondering, "[w]hose child am I"). See generally BEsr INTERr s, supra note 148 (separat-
ing child from parent deleteriously affects a child's sense of continuity).
173. See Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588 (placing a child in foster care embarks us
on a course of emotional abuse of the child, which rarely, if ever, factors into the process of
decision-making the child's trauma).
174. "[S]eparating children from their parents is itself devastating to children of any
age.... Public policy must refocus its efforts to support families so that children can be
safe with the parents they know and love. .. ." AMERICA'S CHLDREN AT lisx, supra
note 18, at 45.
175. See Kates et al., supra note 117, at 584 (asserting that separating the child from
his/her parent causes the child to mourn).
176. 1a at 585.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 584 (describing that children who enter foster care are threatened by
issues of separation which are not limited to mourning of losses, but extend to fear for their
own survival). "[CJhildren in foster care experience placement as a threat to survival, and
child welfare workers, foster care-givers and clinicians ... view the abusive or chaotic
conditions that precipitated placement as the primary threat to the child's survival." Id.
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dren are generally not relieved when taken from a situation that we may
view as risk-ridden. Children are not comforted by being placed in what
we consider a "safe', 179 environment. They do not feel safe, they feel at
risk. When a child feels at risk, she is at risk.
Children who are removed from marginal families, and even from truly
abusive relationships, may still want to be at home, because they want to
be with their parents.'8 0 What the child feels is central to her health and
safety. It is therefore inappropriate to dismiss her feelings when assessing
what course of action is in her best interest. If we place a child in an
environment where her bones are safe, but where she perceives that her
very survival is at risk, then from her perspective she has not been saved
from harm,"' instead, her injury has been compounded.
Placement of the child in foster care implies to the child that either the
child herself or her biological parents are failures, and therefore "bad."'"
When the child is moved from one placement to another, the child's view
of herself as bad is reinforced."s The harm inherent in foster care'84
outweighs the benefit of removal" only if the child is actually at risk of
substantial harm.'8 ' A child who is removed from a dysfunctional family
179. We, the judges, lawyers, and social workers, define safe from the perspective of
how we feel. A placement is safe if there is no physical abuse, no obvious emotional abuse,
and if the place is clean, and sufficiently large for the number of people in residence.
180. Professors Ashe & Calm clearly articulate the frustration experienced by many
attorneys who are involved with CPS cases: "I was often pained by the apparent failure of
social workers and prosecutors to appreciate the violence perpetrated by the legal process
upon a child when he or she is abruptly and forcibly wrenched awmy from parents who,
however inadequate, are nonetheless familiar." Ashe & Cahn, supra note 20, at 79.
181. See ExncuTrvm SunriARY, supra note 111, at 11 (reporting that children in foster
care do not develop a sense of security due to the lack of stability of placements).
182. See Kates et al, supra note 117, at 587 (explaining the dichotomy between the
child's view of themselves and their biological parents as failures and their glorified view of
their foster parents).
183. See id. (detailing the sense of rejection felt by children removed from the foster
home).
184. See AmwICA's CmLDREN AT RisK, supra note 18, at 50 (stating that foster care
children may experience abuse from their foster parents).
185. See Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588 (arguing that foster parents can create a
welcoming environment for the child if they see their role as that of an extended family).
"[T]he well-intentioned efforts of professionals in the welfare system are sometimes misdi-
rected in that professionals work to save the child at the child's expense." Id.
186. See Widom, supra note 99, at 195-96 (discussing out-of-home placement's critics
view that foster care may be more detrimental to the children than maintaining the biologi-
cal family together). See generally Kates et al., supra note 117 (arguing the need to formu-
late new model of foster care that acknowledges child's need to remain with biological
parent). "[Cloercive intervention should not occur in situations involving child neglect.
unless necessary to protect a child from demonstrable physical harm." A~1mucA's CHI-
DREN AT RisK, supra note 18, at 50.
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will require healing from the trauma of the separation and from the ef-
fects of the parental relationship. The scars or effects of the improper
parenting are multiplied by, not resolved through, foster placement.
As it happens, sometimes our need to save the child coincides with the
child's immediate needs, and a child truly at risk is separated from the
perpetrator of severe harm, or a child who has been hurt beyond her
ability to heal within the family is removed from that family. For exam-
ple, a perpetrator of sexual abuse must be separated from the child whom
he is victimizing, preferably without disrupting other relationships of the
child." 7 A child must be removed from any parent whose reliance on
alcohol or drugs is so extreme that the parent cannot care for herself or
others.188 That is not to say, however, that termination of the parental
relationship with such parents is necessarily in the child's best interest.
Nor is it reasonable to expect that the child protective system will be able
to accurately distinguish future perpetrators from other dysfunctional
adults and thus prevent injury to all children who are truly at risk. To
believe that the state can effectively prevent injury to children by remov-
ing them from a future perpetrator is analogous to the belief that crime
can be eliminated through the incarceration of future felons.189
C. Best Interest of the Adult
While evaluating the best interest of the neglected child, we focus on
our own satisfaction of having rescued a poor needy child and on the
horrible irresponsibility of the parents, 190 instead of the experiences and
authentic needs of the child, regardless of whether an alternate placement
is going to meet those needs. In determining whether and when to return
a child to the parent, judges, the state, and attorneys focus on whether the
parent has met a list of middle-class standards. 191 The trauma exper-
187. In the past, when a child was the victim of sexual abuse there was an assumption
the child would not be protected; thus, the child was taken from the home instead of the
perpetrator. Today, however, Texas provides for the removal of the perpetrator from the
home. See Tnx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (Vernon Supp. 1999) (mandating that it is
preferable for the state to remove the alleged perpetrator of the abuse rather than remov-
ing the child).
188. See TEx F.m. CODE ANN. § 161.O01(1)(P) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (ordering courts
to consider a parent's use of a controlled substance when determining whether it is proper
to terminate the parent-child relationship).
189. For an interesting assessment of the American overuse of prisons, see Schlosser,
supra note 80, at 51.
190. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 834 (1977) (explaining studies suggesting that middle-class social workers treat natural
parents' poverty as prejudicial to best interests of child).
191. See generally Ashe & Cahn, supra note 20 (describing the hurdles parents must
overcome to meet their own needs before meeting needs of their children).
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ienced by the displaced child is rarely, if ever, balanced against the risks
associated with returning the child home. Many times an acceptable
home, a job for three months, completion of parenting classes, and coun-
seling are required before the child is returned. Once initiated, couldn't
these goals for the parent be completed while the child is at home?" The
parent-child relationship could then be monitored, and the parent would
be more motivated. 93 With the child at home, the parenting classes and
therapy would be more effective.
Analysis, critical thinking, and creativity of social workers, attorneys,
and judges are essential if we are truly interested in what is best for the
child. Our habit of using two or three alternative solutions for managing a
child abuse case is inadequate. We allow ourselves to fall into the rut of
treating every case as substantially the same. Court orders and CPS plans
of service are similar from one case to the next: the child is put in a "safe
place" and gets medical and psychological care, the parent is given
parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, drug/alcohol treatment, and
maybe counseling. We follow the same pattern, even though we should
have learned from our experience that in many cases if "generic re-unifi-
cation services are offered to a parent... failure is inevitable, as is termi-
nation of parental rights."' 9 4
The Story of E.LB.
These children were... "unwashed, dressed in filthy, soiled clothes,
and infested with lice . .. The house was full of old newspapers and
garbage and had heaps of dirty clothes lying about There was no run-
ning water or electricity nor edible food in the refrigerator.'9 S The
mother was "mildly retarded with an IQ of sixty, [and] a developmental
age of eight years, eleven months.,1 96 She was "not able to properly care
for herself or her children. 19 She did not function as an independent
aduI but was heavily dependent. .."198 The court was horrified that the
192. B6xar County has a program called the "Home Centered Program," where the
parents meet their plan of service while the child is in the home. See infra V.A. (discussing
programs around the nation designed to preserve families).
193. Presently, parent-child visits are more likely to be evidence-gathering sessions
rather than therapeutic sessions.
194. Cf In re Victoria K. v. Carmen S., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 507 (CaL App. 3d 1989)
(explaining how developmentally challenged parents are hindered by generic reunification
services).
195. E.L.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 732 S.W.2d 785,786 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, n.w.h.).
196. Id
197. Id
198. Id.
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children were living under such conditions, and acknowledged the fact
that the mother was also living in the same substandard conditions, but
failed to conclude that perhaps the family would be healthier and hap-
pier if services were provided to the whole family.199 The children were
removed by CPS and eventually the children's relationship with their
mother was terminated 00 The court found that the mother subjected the
children to "deplorable and neglecful conditions."20 1 The appellate
court agreed that there was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
terminate herparental rights. 202 The state presumably found someone to
care for the children. Another arm of the state probably found someone
to care for the mother. I wonder if the state could have found someone to
care for them all-together.
V. WHAT A WE DOING, WHAT CAN WE Do?
A solution to the problem of foster care for the poor must include basic
changes in perspective. We must realize that we cannot eliminate violent
crimes, but we can strengthen families and minimize both neglect and
abuse.203 However, if we want to nurture and protect families, we must
begin with a realization of and willingness to change prejudicial attitudes
towards families that are poor or that are culturally different from "mid-
dle America., 2 4 No program will be effective until the basic systemic
199. See id. (noting appellant and her children constantly changed residences and
lived with a whole host of appellant's relatives).
200. See E.L.B., 732 S.W.2d at 787 (finding it was in the best interests of the child to
terminate parental rights and that such a finding was supported by clear and convincing
evidence).
201. Id. at 786.
202. See id. at 787 (agreeing with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to
terminate parental rights).
203. There is a tension in the CPS arena between acting as a child saver by removing
the child from families who pose a potential risk to the child and providing services in-
tended to preserve the family unit for the benefit of the child. In 1980, Congress passed
the Adoption Assistance & Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500,503
(1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988)). This provision,
among others, required the states to make reasonable efforts to keep families together.
For an assessment of its effectiveness, see Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. Rnv. 223, 227 (1989-90)
(explaining problems in defining reasonable efforts). Later, the Family Preservation and
Family Support Program encouraged states to plan for and fund family preservation pro-
grams. However, in 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) in
response to a concern that family preservation programs and reasonable efforts require-
ments were endangering the safety of children.
204. See generally Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents are Better than None: Whether
Two Single, African American Adults-Who are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic
or Sexual Relationship with Each Other-Should be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent
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prejudice against poor families and families of color is resolved. Further,
the state will have to broaden its vision from the moment of "child sav-
ing" and seriously consider the authentic and continuing needs of the
child. In practice, the change will have to occur in three ways.
First, we must change the way in which we manage the state's intrusion
into family life. We must make it our business to use our resources to
prevent the breakup of families. Several of the programs described be-
low are intended to make that change. Second, in situations where the
child must be removed from one or both parents, we must reconstitute
the structure of the substitute care system so that it reflects the support
system available to successful families. Third, if the child must be re-
moved and if the parent is not able to rehabilitate sufficiently for the
return of the child, then we must be consistent with the policies of private
family law. The child should be allowed to maintain contact with the par-
ent to the greatest extent consistent with her safety. Our focus, as the
alternative to returning the child, should be to maintain the maximum
amount of contact possible between the child and the parent. This
change in focus will help alter the basic attitude towards parents, and
allow us to make decisions actually based on the child's needs. Below, I
will discuss each of these propositions in detail.
A. Family Preservation
The public policy of most, if not all, states acknowledge that it is
desirable for the child to remain with or be reunited' with her family.
Nonetheless, current federal funding priorities still favor out-of-
home care over preventative efforts. 6 Funding priorities should be
African American Children, 35 U. LouisvuLE J. F~. L 703, 703-06 (1997) (discussing
adoption options developed from African American experiences).
205. See Jennifer A. Hand, Preventing Value Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of
the Length-of-Tune-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U.
L REv. 1251, 1277-78 (1996) (submitting that most states are required by statute to make
reasonable efforts to preserve the biological unit as a prerequisite to termination).
206. See AMmncA's CHLDREN AT RsK, supra note 18, at 46 (stating the "current
funding priorities, which favor out-of-home care over preventive efforts, must be re-
versed."). The Federal Family Preservation and Family Support program was intended to
address the funding imbalance betveen out-of-home preventive efforts and family-support
programs. See iL Louise A. Leduc, Note, No-Fault Termination of Parental Rights in Con-
necticut A Substantive Due Process Analysis, 28 CoNN. L RL-v. 1195, 1199 (1996)
(describing that the family preservation movement enjoyed widespread support from both
political parties because of its "focus on helping hold together families in need"). Subse-
quently, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, reversed some of the gains in policy
by adding time-limited services, and expanding termination of parental rights. See id.;
Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key
to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. Rn-v. 1427, 1443-
44 (1998) (observing that the government's reduction of the termination timeline in con-
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changed to favor preventative and reunification services over foster
care.
20 7
For the most part, public policy recognizes that children are better off
and happier with their own families, even if the family is dysfunctional.
There are a few programs that intervene to provide services to families
before any abuse or neglect has been identified.208 Early intervention is
usually extraordinarily successful.209 Of course, it is impossible to know
which families would have become involved with the state had there been
no services provided. Nonetheless, if our goal is to strengthen families, to
provide children with nurturing parents, and to minimize the instances of
abuse and neglect, then we should increase the number and variety of
early prevention programs.
Texas, like several other states, has social workers who provide "in-
home" or "ongoing" services to families at risk. l0 All child abuse refer-
rals are investigated and then either closed, sent to the "in-home" work-
ers,21' or, if the child is removed, sent to the legal units.212 The caseloads
junction with its refusal to increase services will result in an increase of destroyed families
which could have otherwise remained intact).
207. See, e.g., Victoria Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A
Problem That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARY's LJ. 623, 668-72 (1994) (describing The
Shoulder, Inc., a Houston, Texas, model drug treatment center). The center has 35 beds
for women, including pregnant women and women with newborn babies. Id. at 668-69.
The residents go through a detoxification program and a residential program where they
receive counseling, parenting and other skills training, and pediatric care. Id. at 669. The
staff works with the mothers on issues such as locating housing, developing skills, and ob-
taining services in the community. Id. at 670. The estimated cost for treating one woman
for the recommended 60 days residence is approximately $3,500. Id. The taxpayers save
approximately $1,000,000 during a child's first 18 years of life for every drug-free child
born in the United States. Id.
208. For example, "Healthy Families America" exists in a number of states including
Hawaii and California, and works with families at risk of future involvement with CPS. See
Shari Roan, Parents Get an Ounce of Prevention: Home Visitors Act as Extended Families
for Stressed Out Mothers and Fathers in a Bid to Curb Child Abuse, L.A. Tims, Aug. 17,
1993, at Al (outlining the program as it started in Hawaii).
209. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 15 (alleging family preservation programs make it
easier, not harder, to pursue adoption where that is best for a child). Michigan, the state
with the largest family preservation program in America, also has the nation's best record
for getting foster children adopted. Id.
210. These services include mother's helpers, foster grandparents, parenting informa-
tion, and skills programs. The services are provided to families where some risks have
been identified but where legal intervention and removal is not requested by CPS.
211. If the risks associated with the family are deemed by the worker not to be seri-
ous, the referral is sent to an "in home" worker, or closed.
212. The units of child protective workers responsible for children under the tempo-
rary custody of the state are called legal units. Legal workers might have as many as forty
open cases at one time.
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in these "in-home" units are high,2  and the services available to the
family are very limited.
In contrast, a few states have instituted regional or statewide programs
that attempt to prevent placement through the infusion of extensive but
short-term social services to the family. Hawaii,2.1 4 and Washington,215
for example, have plans that are generically labeled "family preserva-
tion," and are characterized by small caseloads and intensive work with
the families. Although a few years ago intensive family preservation was
in favor,216 there has been considerable retrenchment. Family preserva-
tion programs are at risk, partially due to their own expense, but largely
because they have been unjustly blamed for not foreseeing the murders
of children.217 It is a sad error in judgment to attack early prevention and
family preservation programs when a child is murderedV18 It would be a
213. In Bdxar County, the average caseload for a family preservation worker is twenty
cases.
214. See Faye T. Kimura, Paradise in the Making: Hawaii Strengthens Its Child Pro-
tective Services System, 80 A.B.AJ. 79, 79 (1994) (stating that until 1989, the Hawaiian
foster care lacked a unified system). However, the state has now reduced foster home
placement by providing in-home services to those families with children at risk. Id
215. See Paul Knepper & Shannon M. Barton, Statewide Cross Training As a Means of
Court Reform In Child Protection Proceedings, 36 BrAtmms J. FA~t. L 511, 544-45 (1997-
98) (discussing a Washington program "based on extending services to troubled families"
before removal). But see Marva Hammons, Legal and Community Services Advocates
Working Together to Preserve Families, CoLormiA UrnvERsrrY ScHOOL OF LAw, Dec. 1-2,
1994, 3 J.L & Pol'y 469, 469-70 (1995) (questioning the concept of "family preservation
model").
216. Funding through the Federal Family Preservation and Family Support Program
requires that the states plan implementation of integrated statewide family preservation
and/or family support services. See AhmEcA's Cm1ILDRE AT Risi, supra note 18, at 45-47
(discussing different funding procedures of programs). The states have been given a great
deal of flexibility in the types of programs they may implement. See itd But see Pat McEl-
roy & Cynthia Goodsoe, Family Group Decision Making Offers Alternative Approach to
Child Welfare, YouTH LAWv NEws, May-June 1998, at 8 (outlining the criticism and the de-
funding of family preservation). Recently, the federal government has cut the funding
available to the states for social service programs, thus resulting in cut-backs in the pro-
grams. See, eag., Gil Lawson, Elderly, Children Hit Hardest by Budget Cuts, Tim COURMR-
J. (Louisville), Nov. 26, 1996, at 1B, available in 1996 WL 6371075.
217. See Joseph Gerth, 1995 Tol" 8 Children Under State Supervision Died of Abuse
or Neglect, THE CoumRIR-J., (Louisville), July 21,1996, at 14A, available in 1996 WL
6355087 (describing how Kentucky is cutting back on the state's Family Preservation Pro-
gram in order to recruit more foster care parents because of his fear of abused children);
Richard J. Gelles, First We Must Preserve the Abused Children, TAmPA TRm., Oct. 13,1997
at 9 (describing several instances of abuse under state supervision programs). But see Kes-
tin, supra note 116, at 1 (arguing that "distinguishing between the families who can be
helped and those who will likely harm again" is unreasonably difficult).
218. See Jill S. Levenson, Scapegoating Social Workers Won't Help Kids, SuN-Smrn.
NEt., (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov.24,1997 at 15A (stating that the "finger pointing" needs to
stop and the community as a whole needs to take responsibility for "creating proactive
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blessing if through some consistent premonition social workers could un-
failingly identify those adults who are likely to engage in extreme vio-
lence. But they cannot; no one can. Could a caseworker be expected to
identify the risk of murder based on one home visit or even two? Per-
haps if the worker had been to the home weekly, had spoken to the fam-
ily daily. But that would have required a caseload of only three or four
cases. 
21 9
Family preservation programs attempt to reduce the instance of foster
care through the use of comprehensive social services over a short period
of time.2 0 Family preservation workers have a small caseload, two to
four families, with whom they work intensely.221 The workers provide a
variety of services, strengthening the family that is at risk of having a
child removed to foster care.' The combination of a small caseload and
the availability of intense and varied services sets these programs apart
from the standard "in-home" programs currently available throughout
the country.
An apparent flaw is the "family preservation" program's presupposi-
tion that the workers will be able to accurately identify those families
who are at risk of having a child removed. The workers may spend time
providing family preservation services to families whose children would
never have been removed. And many families .who are at risk might
never be referred to or accepted into such a program, resulting in an
equal number of children being placed in foster care. As mentioned
above, another criticism that has arisen recently is the failure of the sys-
tem to identify children who will be murdered, and preventing the mur-
der through removal of the child from the home."
A different approach that has drawn attention recently is "Family
Group Decision Making," which has been instituted under various names
in Oregon, California, Canada and New Zealand.' 4 The program aug-
changes that make sense"); Wexler, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that family preservation
programs will not keep children safe).
219. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 3 (reporting that Illinois changed its family preser-
vation program after the death of a young child). As a result of these changes, the number
of children in foster care increased by 30% over the next year, thereafter the number of
children's deaths due to abuse increased. See id Connecticut had a similar experience
with an increase in children in foster care and a corresponding increase in the death rate
for children. See id
220. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsborn, supra note 17.
221. See id.
222. Services might include stress management, maintaining self-control, classes on
discipline, housekeeper services, help with transportation, and other services that help the
family deal with daily struggles.
223. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsborn, supra note 17.
224. See McElroy & Goodsoe, supra note 216 at 1.
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ments the family preservation programs by relying on or including the
extended family in assessing the needs of the children and in determining
how those needs can be met and what services are required. In some
areas, the program is founded on mediation between the state and the
family of the child."2
With some success, Texas has experimented with several service-inten-
sive programs"36 A program, called the Home Centered Program, is
presently in place in B6xar County." 7 The Home Centered unit becomes
involved with families immediately after the adversarial hearing, the
point at which the state is initially granted temporary custody of a
child.'3 Families are referred to the Home Centered unit by the investi-
gating caseworker, the judge, or one of the attorneys.2 9 The worker and
supervisor of the unit meet with the family, assess their level of commit-
ment, and decide whether or not to accept the case."' Once a case is
accepted, even though the state continues to have legal custody of the
child, the child is placed back in the home. 3 ' The workers in the Home
Centered unit each have two to four cases and work intensely with the
families assigned to them. They attempt to build on the family's strengths
and help the family overcome its weaknesses.3l If the family is success-
ful in overcoming the stated risks, and the success rate is very high, the
worker recommends that the legal case be dismissed.3 3 Unfortunately,
the Home Centered unit is small.3 4 The low caseload and intensity of
services allows participation of only a small percentage of families whose
children are in state custody. The unit accepts cases only at the initial
hearing stage and wil not accept cases that involve sexual, drug, or alco-
hol abuse.
If, as a nation, we wish to save families, we must begin by adopting a
comprehensive plan, which includes one or more models of intense serv-
ices focused on family preservation or reunification, in addition to ongo-
ing protective services for those families needing an occasional helping
225. See id. (explaining that the parties can reach resolution through mediation with-
out the Child Welfare Agency becoming involved); see also Exncunrvn Su~ziARv, supra
note 111 at 42-47 (stating that the Texas Supreme Court Task Force on Foster Care also
recommended increased use of mediation in CPS cases).
226. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsborn, supra note 17.
227. See id. (noting there are other programs available on limited county-wide basis in
Texas).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Telephone Interview with Rose Orsborn, supra note 17.
233. See id.
234. See id.
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hand. 3 We must fund enough of the intense services units to provide
services to all of the families who are at risk. In addition, for the intense
services programs to be effective, the workers must be willing to provide
in-home services to families who, today, would have their child removed.
Programs like the Home Centered Program will have to be expanded,
and the criteria and time for admission be liberalized. That means chil-
dren will remain in families where a risk already exists. Children will stay
with substance-abusing parents. 6 and with homeless parents. The
worker, foster grandparent, case aide, or homemaker will have to be
present in the home three or four times a week. They will have to help
clean, help transport, help apply for benefits, and do whatever else it
takes to help the family rehabilitate.
B. Temporary Foster Care
Research suggests that children are better off if they are able to main-
tain some level of contact with their parents,2 7 and that collaboration
between the parents and the foster parents is best for the child. 8 Others
envision a system where services are provided to the whole family, not
235. See Knepper & Barton, supra note 215, at 526 (describing cross-training and mul-
tidisciplinary training as "an effective tool for reducing role ambiguity among decision
makers in the child protection process"). Knepper and Barton discuss nine criteria that
should be met in cross-training. The nine criteria are:
(a) Trainers should agree upon each professional's decision-making role.
(b) Training sessions should occur prior to entry into service.
(c) Training should follow guidelines formulated for each role.
(d) Training should be locally based.
(e) Training should include GALS, CASA, and all who appear on behalf of the chil-
dren, parents, and social service agencies.
(f) Training should explain the rationale for public law governing child protection
agency.
(g) Training should include discussions of successful categories; should describe
expectations.
(h) Professionals should share knowledge of gaps during training sessions.
(i) Training should focus on interpersonal and organizational communication, team
building, and intersystem problem solving.
Id.
236. See Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Family Support to Succeed,
22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 311, 329 (1996) (supporting substance abusing parents
to maintain the needs of the children with help of an interagency approach for family
preservation).
237. See Kates et al., supra note 117, at 588 (suggesting the necessity to involve par-
ents in child's daily life).
238. See id (stating that collaboration between biological and foster parents is helpful
for the child).
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just the child m 9 The foster parents, whom I prefer to call substitute care-
givers, should be considered as extended family members helping the par-
ents.24 ° They should be viewed by the children, parents, state and court
as foster grandparents, or as a foster aunt and uncle. Then the child
would not confuse241 the role or identity of the care-givers and the par-
ents. The substitute care-givers would work directly with the parents so
that both are involved in the daily decisions about the care of the child. 24
And all could work together to return the child home.
Currently, in child protective cases in B6xar County, Texas, parents
visit their children only twice a month for one hour each visit.243 In the
vast majority of cases, the foster parents have no contact with the natural
parents?" Once the decision is made not to return the child to the cus-
tody of the parent, the case is assessed for termination. Most of those
cases end with the termination of parental rights and termination of all
contact between the parent and the child.
C. Why Terminate?245
Some parents are unable to care for their children. Some parents with
low IQs who love their children are nonetheless incapable of caring for
them. Some parents who have substance abuse problems 46 too severe
for lasting rehabilitation might never be able to care adequately for their
239. See generally Nancy S. Erickson, Preventing Foster Care Placement Supportive
Services in the Home, 19 J. FAM. L 569 (1981) (arguing that placement of child in foster
care should be last resort).
240. See Kupenda, supra note 204, at 711-13 (focusing on the African American ex-
tended family members using the traditional model).
241. See id at 712 (explaining that the children refer to the co-parents by relationship
titles, even if there is no blood relationship). Adults who were raised by family members
will frequently say- "I call her mom because she raised me, but she is really my aunt." In
this situation, there is no confusion of identities and there is recognition of the psychologi-
cal parent as well.
242. See Erickson, supra note 239, at 574 (presenting techniques the foster parents
could use to keep the biological parents informed about their child).
243. This is the standard visitation schedule proposed by the department and ordered
in the majority of cases in B6xar County. When the child is in the children's shelter, the
parent is allowed to visit several times a week. Once the child is placed in a foster home,
the visits are limited for the convenience of the family preservation worker and the foster
family.
244. Many times the names of the foster parents are kept confidential.
245. See Victoria . Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers. A
Problem That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARC's LJ. 623, 672 (1994) (concluding that
prenatal drug use should not result in punishment of the mother through termination of
parental rights; "[i]nstead, legislatures should seek to enact laws that encourage and foster
a positive maternal-child relationship.").
246. See generally Vanessa W. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 810 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991), writ granted, 817 S.W.2d 62 (TIex. 1991) (per curiam) (suggesting Va-
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child. Parents with certain psychotic or neurotic disorders might become
too unstable to continue to provide daily care for their child. Today, we
deal primarily with these cases through termination of parental rights,247
and the hope of adoption. The child, whether adopted or not, has no
continued contact with the parent and may never be given the opportu-
nity to assess or internalize the reality of the parent's disability.2 48
A plan for long-term care with continued contact with the parent and
other relatives is better for the child. If the child cannot be returned
home, then the child should be placed with a long-term, permanent, sub-
stitute care-giver 249 or, if more appropriate, in a residential treatment
home. Even if contact must be highly structured, the child must be in a
setting where communication with the parent and other significant adults
is still possible. This type of a plan is particularly necessary in the many
cases where at least one of the children is old enough to know and have
bonded with the parent. A positive side effect to the plan is that the
social worker has a single, constant goal, and does not have to make the
emotional switch between reunification and termination. The worker can
focus on preserving, to the fullest extent possible, the relationship be-
tween the child and the parent. Parents will respond to the positive atti-
tude of the worker and more likely maintain interest in keeping and
caring for their children.
Further, the plan is consistent with what would have been done in pri-
vate family law setting. This proposal is consistent with the many private
adoptions where the birth mother is allowed to continue to have contact
with the adoptive parents. It is consistent with the many intra-family
placements that occur formally or informallyy 0 and many times is cultur-
ally more appropriate. The plan is also consistent with what happens in
cases where the parent has enough money and is concerned enough to
provide substitute care for the child. Over the years, we have found
nessa might have been rehabilitated if she had been with her child while services were
being provided).
247. See TEx. FA.v. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (requiring ter-
mination if it is found by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "failed to support
the child in accordance with his ability during a period .... ").
248. At the Civil Justice Clinic we currently represent one mother whose children are
in long term (permanent) foster care. The oldest child is angry at her mother and does not
want to visit with her, although the younger children see her regularly. Although we con-
sider the situation with the oldest child a problem, at least she knows her mother and has
begun to deal with her anger towards her mother.
249. The foster care-giver should still not try to replace the parent. As time goes on,
the care-giver and child will develop appropriate language to reflect their relationship and
to reflect the child's relationship with the absent parent.
250. See Kupenda, supra note 204 at 711-13 (discussing possible alternative
placements).
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adoptive parents for children with severe emotional and physical disabili-
ties; similarly, we could, 1 if we tried, find substitute care families willing
to enter into long term care programs35 2
CONCLUSION
In 1980, Nancy S. Erickson wrote,
[W]hat is demanded is an acceptance of the basic notion that a
child's own family, even if poor, ill-housed, and marginally function-
ing, is the least detrimental alternative for that child. Visions of sav-
ing the child by transporting her to a middle-class foster home must
be rejected. Intellectually these ideas may not be hard to grasp;
emotionally they are extremely difficult to accept.'
In Bdxar County, Texas, like in most other counties in the country, we
are well entrenched in "saving" children from families who are poor, ill-
housed, and only marginally functional. Most of the children we are
"saving" are children of color.
A disparity between the application of the law in the private family law
cases and the child welfare cases is clear. Frequently, respondents in
child welfare cases have their children taken away for far fewer deficien-
cies than would be required in a case filed by a private individual. Termi-
nation of parental rights of respondents in child welfare cases occurs far
more frequently than with respondents in private cases, even with cases
containing similar facts. In child welfare cases, the courts gloss over laws
that purportedly require strict construction.
Child welfare agencies have enormous power over their adverse par-
ties, most of whom are poor, most of whom are women, most of whom
are women of color. The question is whether a system that developed
from intrusion into the lives of the poor can be reconstituted to provide
services that will nurture the quality of the lives of all children. If it can-
not, then we should scrap the system and start over.
251. See Melanie McFarland, With Open Arms: Seattle Foster Mother's Nurtring Is
Focus of PBS Documentary, SEATnT Thaws, Jan. 8, 1998, at El (describing the Casey
Family Program, which operates in 13 states, offers long-term care for children and has
been able to develop families willing to enter into such an arrangement).
252. Currently Child Protective Services does not seek nor train long-term foster fam-
ilies because there is no public funding for such a program. See Telephone Interview with
Rose Orsborn, supra note 17.
253. See Erickson, supra note 239, at 608 (arguing that children should be placed in
foster care only when no other options are available).
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